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THE

"FREE MARKET" OF IDEAS, INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES, AND INFLUENCE

RICHARD CLAUDE*
JUDITH KIRCHHOFF *

"It oversteps basic logicfor someone to say, 'Mr. Reagan, we electedyou and
ifyou don't do what we say, we're going to turnyou out. ' '"
Richard Richardson, Republican National Committee Chairman,
New York Times, Sunday, January 18, 1981, p. 18, c. 3.

I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980 presidential election signaled a dramatic shift in the
conduct of federal elections. Americans witnessed the official
campaign, authorized and controlled by the presidential candidate,
and one or many unofficial campaigns, unauthorized, perhaps even
unwanted, by the candidate. In essence, federal elections today are
marked by the existence of multiple campaigns. Unraveling the
intricacies and explanations of this multiple campaign phenomenon
is as complex a task as charting the genetic code of a Mendelian
hybrid. The multiple campaign concept has its roots in the desire to
ensure a free flow of ideas, a goal as old as the country itself. It has
been nurtured by election reform legislation as modified by United
States Supreme Court interpretations and by administrative
*Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland; Ph.D, University of Virginia.
-Organization Consultant; M.A.P.A., University of Illinois.
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decisions of the Federal Election Commission (Commission). In the
1980 presidential election, the idea matured as a result of political
committees taking skillful advantage of the statutes by acting
"independently of" (sometimes in opposition to) the candidate.
This article will examine the various causes of the multiple
campaign phenomenon. Part I will explore the free market of ideas
as applied to federal election campaigns,I first by focusing on its
historical evolution in light of the first amendment, and second, by
examining the court-decreed distinction between expressing ideas
through contributions and through expeditures. Part II turns to an
examination of the Federal Election Commission, 2 probing its
administrative decisions for clues regarding the proliferation of
"political action committees" and their use of "independent
expenditures." Part III analyzes whether the environment for
influence through "big money" multiple campaigns will be
informally reconstituted as a result of current litigation. 3 Finally, a
conclusion is offered in which suggestions are made for the more
effective future control of this multiple campaign phenomenon. 4
II. THE FREE MARKET OF IDEAS
The concern for fair presidential elections has been longstanding. In The Federalist No. 68, Alexander Hamilton wrote that
the framers of the Constitution sought a stable presidential
selection process "to afford as little opportunity as possible to
tumult and disorder." ' 5 In 1884 the United States Supreme Court
observed that, along with violence, one of the "great natural and
historical
enemies"
of orderly elections
is
"insidious
corruption"-the consequence of "the free use of money in
elections. ",6 In the 1934 test case on the Corrupt Practices Act, 7 the
United States Supreme Court reasoned that government cannot be
powerless to deal with so serious a threat to electoral integrity as
reproachable campaign financing. 8 The Court in that case
1. See infra notes 5 to 90 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 91 : 135 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 136 to 188 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 189 to 193 and accompanying text.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 68 at 245 (A. Hamilton) (Charles Scribner's Sons 1921). For a
discussion of the pluralist theory underlying the Federalist essays and other contemporary but
contrasting theories bearing on the electoral process, see Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 345, 369 (1977).
6. Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S, 651, 658, 667 (1884).
7. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (currently codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.A. (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)). For a short historical development
of legislative attempts to curb electoral abuses, see infra note 10.
8. Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934).
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concluded that "[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of
President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the
choice of the means to that end presents a question primarily
addressed to the judgment of Congress." 9
In the twentieth century, Congress has sought, with little
success, to minimize electoral fraud and corruption at the federal
level by various strategies. 10 Reformers have experimented with the
following ideas in seeking fair federal elections: (1) Fixing a ceiling
on campaign contributions and expenditures;1 1 (2) requiring
disclosure to throw the "pitiless light" of full publicity onto the
sources and uses of political money; 12 (3) using subsidy tax
9. Id. The power of Congress is derived from article one of the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
51.
10. The first significant attempt to curb electoral abuses was the Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L.
No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. S 441b (West 1977 & Supp. 1980))
which prohibited national banks and corporations from contributing to candidates and parties
involved in federal elections.
The Tillman Act was followed in 1910 by a more comprehensive statute that required all
interstate political committees to report campaign contributions, and to identify all sources of
contributions of $100.00 or more. The Act of 1910 also required the reporting of expenditures and
the disclosure of the purpose of such expenditures equal to or exceeding $10.00. Act ofJune 25, 1910
ch. 392, SS 5, 6, 36 Stat. 823-24.
Another congressional attempt to minimize electoral corruption was the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act passed into law on February 28, 1925. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (currently
codified in scattered sections of2, 18 U.S.C.A. (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)). The Act provided that
any political committee which accepted contributions or made expenditures for the purpose of
influencing the election of presidential or vice-presidential electors in two or more states should have
a chairman and a treasurer. The Act further required the treasurer of such committee to keep a
detailed account of all contributions made to, and all expenditures made by, such committees. These
sections were repealed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.2 U.S.C.A. §S 431-455 (West
1977 & Supp. 1980) (originally enacted as Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92225, S 301, 86 Stat. 11, as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-443, S 201, 88 Stat. 1272; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-283, § 101, 90 Stat. 475; and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-187, § 101,93 Stat. 1339) [hereinafter cited as FECAl.
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act was supplemented by passage of the Hatch Political Activity
Act of 1939, which prohibited active participation by federal employees in federal elections. Hatch
Political Activiiy Act of 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (currently codified in scattered sections of 1, 5,
18 U.S.C.A. to the extent not repealed by subsequent legislation). The Federal Corrupt Practices
Act and the Hatch Political Activity Act existed as the most significant federal law on this subject
until passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 extended the Tillman Act's prohibition on political
contributions by labor unions. Act ofJune 25, 1943, ch. 144, S 9, 57 Stat. 167-68. This prohibition
was later recodified in the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, which extended
the prohibition to direct expenditures, primary elections, and political conventions held for the
purpose ofselecting candidates for federal office. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120,
S 304, 61 Stat. 136.
11. Under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as supplemented by the Hatch Political
Activity Act of 1939, a contributor could give no more than $5,000 to a particular campaign. The
first effective expenditure ceilings were enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-443, S 208, 88 Stat. 1279 (1974) (current version at 2
4
U.S.C.A. 5 41a(a)(1)(c) (West 1977)).
12. The first significant disclosure law was enacted in 1910. Act ofJune 25, 1910 ch. 392, §S 5,
6, 36 Stat. 824. Federal Campaign Disclosure laws are now codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-434, 437
(West Supp. 1980).
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incentives to draw into politics money with "no strings
attached,"'" and; (4) setting up a system of public financing of
presidential campaigns."' Unfortunately, the options employed
have not been completely successful at reducing election fraud.
In 1962 President Kennedy's Presidential Commission on
Campaign Expenditures reviewed several of these options and
urged the encouragement, largely by tax incentives, of unlimited
contributions for bipartisan campaign activities.15 Because
collecting and spending ceilings imposed by the loophole-ridden
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as supplemented by the Hatch Act
of 1939, merely resulted in the ruse of proliferating committees, 16
the 1962 Report of the President's Commission called for more
stringent disclosure rules. 1 7 Moreover, in view of prosecution
difficulties under the Taft-Hartley ban on -labor and corporate
political donations,' 8 the 1962 Commission called for the
elimination of ceilings on federal campaign expenditures in favor of
renewing emphasis on effective accounting for receipts and outlays
by all political committees.' 9 In 1967 President Johnson urged a
more thorough campaign to combat corruption and called on
Congress to "[r]eform our campaign financing laws to assure full
disclosure of contributions and expenses, to place realistic limits on
contributions, and to remove the meaningless and ineffective
ceilings on campaign expenditures.' '20
Although strides were taken in the 1960s, the effort to curb
abuses reached its apex with the passage of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971.21 The Act generally implemented public
disclosure of campaign financing and set caps on amounts spent for
13. 1.R. C. 5 4 1.
14. I.R.C. §9006-9013, 9031-9042.
15. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1220 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].

16. Although the Corrupt Practices Act prohibited a contributor from giving more than $5,000
to a particular campaign, a contributor could circumvent the Act by contributing up to $5,000 to
each of an unlimited number of political committees. See 2 U.S.C.A. 5 441(a)(1)(c) (West 1977)
(aggregate contributions to political committees limited to $5,000).
Further, the $3,000.000 limitation on political committee expenditures proved ineffective
because under the Hatch Act a political committee included only committees operating in more than
one state. Federal Corrupt Practice Act, ch. 368, tit. III, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (currently
codified in scattered sections of2, 18 U.S.C.A. (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)).
17. See 1962 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 17-20.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)).
For a complete statutory history and compilation of the Taft-Hartley, Corrupt Practices, and
Hatch Act provisions relating to federal elections, see S. Doc. No. 68, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
19. 1962 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 17-20.
20. President's Message to Congress on "The Political Process in America," 3 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. 780 (May 25, 1967).
21. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
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campaigning in federal elections. 22 At the time, this reform
measure was the most comprehensive campaign regulation of this
century. Yet, Congress realized that this was only the beginning of
legislative revitalization in this area. Inspired in part by the
realization that more comprehensive reform was needed and by
the blatant evidence of abuses in the 1972 presidential election, an
overwhelmingly Democratic majority in Congress enacted more
complete reform measures in 1974 in an effort to make presidential
campaigns more fair. 23 The centerpiece of this legislation was the
creation of the bipartisan Federal Election Commission
(Commission) 4 which was assigned the factfinding, investigative,
and interpretational powers of "a regulatory agency for the basic
process by which political power is attained and transferred in
modern democratic society. "25 Under the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, which set up the
Commission, a regulatory program was established. 26 The new
22. The FECA of 1971 contained five principal components. First, it established rules
regulating media access by candidates. Second, it set limits on the amount that could be spent by or
on behalf of a candidate in using communications media. Third, it required disclosure of campaign
contributions and expenditures. Fourth, it repealed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.
Finally, the FECA assigned to various regulatory agencies the task of establishing rules with respect
to the extension of credit to federal candidates. (currently codified at 2 U.S.C.A. SS 431-455 (West
1977 & Supp. 1980)) (for legislative history see supra note 10).
23. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
24. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, S 208, 88 Stat. 1279 (current version at 2
U.S.C.A. 437c (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)).
25. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1974 at V (1976).
26. 2 U.S.C.A. § 438 (West Supp. 1980). The Federal Election Commission is a quasiindependent regulatory agency designed to replace the tripartite system of supervision over the
FECA that had been operating since 1972. The tripartite scheme vested enforcement authority in the
Secretary of the Senate for Senate elections, the Clerk of the House for House elections, and the
Comptroller General for all other federal campaigns. FECA of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 5 3 01(g),
86 Stat. 12 (1972). The new Commission was to be composed of six voting members: two appointed
by the President, two by the Speaker of the House (upon recommendation by the Majority and
Minority Leaders), and two by the President Pro Tern of the Senate (upon like recommendations).
FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, tit. 11, S 208(a), 88 Stat. 1280 (1974). According
to Commissioner Neil Staebler of the Federal Election Commission, this arrangement evolved from
the unwillingness of House members to relinquish control over the supervision of their own elections.
[19791 FEC POLITICAL ACTION REPORT 47. The United States Supreme Court, however, declared the
membership composition of the Commission to be in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976); see Claude, NationalizingElectoralProcess Standards: Is an
Obituaryfor States' Rights Premature?, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 373, 392-97 (1977). The composition of the
Commission was subsequently changed to three Republicans and three Democrats, all appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. 2 U.SC.A. S 437c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980). The new
Commission membership appears to present the potential for partisan deadlock because four votes
are needed to decide an issue. 2 U.S.C.A. S 437c(c) (West Supp. 1980). Only a handful of the
hundreds of significant votes, however, have split along party lines. 1 19791 FEC POLITICAL ACTION
REPORT 36.
The Commission can act on the formal complaint of any citizen. 2 U.S.C.A. S 437g(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1980). Further, the agency can conduct investigations to determine the existence of violations
and can effect judgment through conciliation or court action. 2 U.S.CA. 5 437d & f (West Supp.
1980). Inquiries also can be initiated internally as a result of routine monitoring procedures. 2
U.S.C.A. 5 437g(a)(2)(West Supp. 1980).
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regulations were designed to enhance the integrity of federal
elections in several ways. The Amendments' more significant
provisions included stringent limits on the amounts that could be
contributed to or expended by a candidate for federal office, 2 7
mandatory public disclosure of contributions and expenditures, 28
and establishment of a public fund program for presidential
elections. 29
A broad first and fifth amendment challenge was presented to
this network of regulations in Buckley v. Valeo, 30 decided per curiam
by the United States Supreme Court in 1976. The Court in Buckley
upheld the constitutionality of the public financing scheme and the
Once a violation is discovered, voluntary compliance is the preferred and usual method of
enforcement. Disputes that require a voted-upon ruling by the Commission are called Matters
Under Review (MUR). Records of MUR proceedings are available to the public after the
proceedings are finished. 2 U.S.C.A. S 437g(a)(4)(B)(i) & (ii) (West Supp. 1980). See Curtis,
Reflections on Voluntary Compliance Under the FederalElection Campaign Act, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 830
(1979). The Commission also issues advisory opinions to authorized persons, candidates, and
committees. These memoranda carry the weight of law when followed in good faith by the requesting
party, but advisory opinions are not applicable to others unless essentially similar facts can be
demonstrated. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437f (West. Supp. 1980). The weight of law does not apply if the
advisory opinion involves issues that are dealt with in proposed rules which are not yet effective. The
resulting problem for administrative law-making was commented upon by Commissioner Staebler in
the following terms:
The Commission has faced a number of decisions of considerable significance to the
on-going political process. One of the early decisions concerned the right of unions and
corporations to establish political action committees. One interpretation of the Act
held that unions had the right to establish such committees as they had in the past but
that the corporations' rights to do so should be drastically limited. The Commission
decided that the rights of corporations and unions were parallel. Congress, which had
fudged the issue in the 1974 Act, agreed with the Commission in the 1976
Amendments.
[1979] FEC POLITICAL ACTION REPORT 40.

27. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974). The limitations
designated by the 1974 Amendments are contained in title 2, section 441 of the United States Code
Annotated. The Code contains four categories of limitations: First, there is a $1,000 limit on
individual or group contributions to candidates or their authorized committees. 2 U.S.C.A. S
441a(a) (West 1977). Second, there is a $5,000 ceiling placed on any contributions by a
multicandidate committee. 2 U.S.C.A. S 441a(a)(2) (West 1977). Third, a limit of $25,000 is
imposed on the aggregate contributions of an individual. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(3) (West 1977).
Finally, an individual is limited to a currency contribution of$100. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441g (West 1975).
The 1974 Amendment also increased the maximum penalty for violation of the contribution laws to
$25,000.2 U.S.C.A. § 441 (West 1977).
28. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433-437a (1976). Sections 435, 436 and 437a were repealed in 1976 in rcsponse
to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). FECA
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976). For an extended discussion of
Buckley, see infra notes 30 to 54 and accompanying text.
29. I.R.C. §§ 9001-9013, 9031-9042. The FECA Amendment of 1974 retained the basic
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1971, but was significant in establishing more comprehensive
regulations to govern the public financing scheme.
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Judicial review of the statute was invited by its terms, which authorized
"any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of the President to bring a federal court
proceeding 'to construe the constitutionality of any provision of the Act.' " FECA Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1285 (1974). The trial judge's responsibility was simply to
formulate "questions of constitutionality" to be certified to the appropriate court of appeals sitting
en banc, which was required to expedite its ruling "to the greatest possible extent." Id. at 1286. The
amendment concerning judicial review (currently 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h (West 1977 & Supp. 1980)) was
promptly employed by its author, Senator Buckley of New York, to challenge the constitutionality of
the new law. He was joined in the suit by Eugene McCarthy, McCarthy's campaign contributor
Stewart Mott, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1976).
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allotment formula for presidential elections even though neither
was scheduled to be implemented until 1976.31 The Court also
upheld the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements
concerning campaign contributions and expenditures. 3" Most
significantly, the Court upheld, against constitutional attack, the
limitations on campaign contributions. 33 The Court held
unconstitutional, however, the provisions relating to expenditure
limitations. 34 It was the Court's fine line drawing on this last
holding that has generated the most controversy surrounding the
35
Buckley decision.
While acknowledging that "[tihe Act's contribution and
expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental
first amendment activities,"36 six members of the Court
distinguished emphatically between the act of spending money and
the act of giving it. 3 The majority rejected the argument that the
limitations restrict effective political communication under the first
amendment and upheld limitations on direct contributions to
political candidates as representing "only a marginal restriction on
the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." 38 The
Court reasoned that a limitation on the amount which could be
given to a candidate did not constitute a direct restraint since the
contribution transformed into political expression involved speech
by someone other than the contributor. 3 9 Although the free speech
argument was rejected, the Court explicitly recognized that
contribution limits infringe on an individual's political association
rights under the first amendment. 40 The Court held, however, that
these first amendment infringements, as applied to the contribution
limitations, were outweighed by the governmental interests in
avoiding the reality and appearance of corruption by large
campaign contributors. 4 1 In sum, the contribution provisions of the
Act, which impose a $1,000 limit on gifts to candidates,4 2 a $5,000
31. 424 U.S. at 143.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality
of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (1976); Nicholson,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis.
L. REV. 323.
36. 424 U.S. at 14.
37. Id. at 19-23.
38. Id. at 20-2 1.
39. Id. at21.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. The explanation offered was that the contribution ceilings "serve the basic governmental
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the
rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion." Id. at 58.
42. Id. at 23-35.
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ceiling on contributions by a political committee to a single
candidate, 4 3 and a $25,000 lid on total donations by an individual
during any calendar year 44 were held constitutionally valid.
On free speech grounds, seven members of the Court held
unconstitutional the statutory limitations on individual citizens'
expenditures in support of federal candidates, 45 and six Justices
concurred in voiding the ceiling on total spending by a candidate
from his personal funds. 46 The Court reasoned that expenditure
limitations constitute more direct restraints on free speech and,
thus, unduly infringe first amendment rights. 47 The Court adopted
the view, pressed by Senators Buckley, McCarthy, and others, that
expenditure limitations would seriously constrain access to the
expensive mass media, which are "indispensable instruments of
effective political speech. "48 Although the content of purchased
campaign advertising was not deemed censorious, the statute was
nevertheless condemned by six justices for limiting political
expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of First
Amendment freedoms. '"49 In sum, the governmental interests tied
to the limits on spending were not sufficient to justify the
50
abrogation of speech and association rights affected by the statute.
43. Id. at 35-36.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id. at 44. Only Mr. Justice White dissented on this point. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part
in the consideration of or decision in Buckley v. Valeo. The objectionable spending ceiling restricted
individuals and groups from spending more than $1,000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate
during a calendar year." FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
46. 424 U.S. at 52 (White,J., & Marshall,J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
50. The Court seemed unconcerned with the argument that expenditure ceilings reinforce the
contribution limits and thereby help to minimize the hazard of corruption. See Dunn, Contributions in
American ElectoralProcess, 3 AM. POL. Q. 221 (April 1974).
The majority of the Buckley Court found the spending limits unsupported by a compelling
governmental interest such as (a) preventing corruption; (b) muting the voice of the affluent; or (c)
holding down election costs. 424 U.S. at 56-57. The majority concluded that eliminating the danger
of corruption is not achieved by a $1,000 spending limit when an unlimited amount could be spent to
promote the candidate's views without actually endorsing him. Id. at 26.
By virtue of the Court's reasoning, the reader of the per curiam opinion might reason that under
circumstance X, a $2,000 advertisement (twice the allowable limit) paid for by group A to promote
candidate B for election would supply a basis for prosecution, but such an advertisement under
circumstance Y to promote B's views without specific reference to his candidacy would not be
affected by the statute. The majority viewed the lines to be drawn between circumstance X and
circumstance Y as defectively unclear. Id.. at 77-79. Even if such lines could be specifically drawn in
case by case interpretations of the statute by the Federal Election Commission, a loophole is revealed
that belies the governmental interest in seeking to avoid corruption by means so hazardous as to
threaten free speech values. On this point, the Court's conclusion was presented in the following
terms:
It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty
devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or
defeat ....
Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing
provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and
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Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority for producing a
ruling with the incongruous result of holding the lid on
contributions but underwriting a "sky's the limit" approach to
independent expenditures. According to the Chief Justice, the
Court's attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in
political contributions from the speech aspects of political
expenditures simply "will not wash. "51 Such word games should
be avoided, reasoned Burger, in favor of recognizing that
people-candidates and contributors- spend money on political
activity because they wish to communicate ideas. Their
constitutional interests do not vary simply because someone else
52
utters the words.
Justice White dissented, arguing that Congress was plainly of
the view that campaign expenditures, like contributions, have
corruptive potential. He thought it incongruous to strike down the
spending limit while retaining the contribution limit."5 In so doing,
the Court "strangely enough ...claim[ed] more insight as to what
may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the
majority of Congress that passed this bill and the President who
signed it."'54
Because Buckley v. Valeo established that it is more blessed to
spend than to give, Congress, the courts, and the Federal Election
Commission sought to deal with the lengthening shadow of the
expenditure-contribution distinction. To ensure that Buckley did
not result in many little givers unfairly aggregating their resources
in the uncontrolled hands of a few big spenders, Congress amended
the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1976 to impose new limits on
55
contributions to political committees.
organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper
influence over candidates for elective office.
424 U.S. at 45.
Leventhal refers to this as reasoning based on illogically chosen assumptions about human
nature. See Leventhal, Courts and Political
Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 361-62 (1977).
51. 424 U.S. at 244. Chief Justice Burger contended that the Act's disclosure scheme is too
broad, that the contribution limits infringe on first amendment liberties, and that the system for
public financing is "an impermissible intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private
political process." Id. at 235.
52. Id. at 244. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that it is unrealistic to argue that a distinction
between "independent" and "authorized" political activity can be made using the existence or
absence of consultation with a candidate as the determining factor. Id. at 239. The Chief Justice
cross-referenced his view to that ofJustice Thurgood Marshall on a related point. The latter Justice
observed, in dissent, that the Act's provisions limiting a candidate's spending from his personal
resources as expenditures is voided. But by the majority's logic, these provisions could be treated as
limits on contributions, since they limit what the candidate can give to his own campaign. Id. at 28790.
53. Id. at 258 (White,J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 261.
55. FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976). In focusing on
contribution limits to political committees, the Act defined "contribution" broadly to include
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Before 1976 the contribution ceilings pertained only to
donations given either to the candidate or to the candidate's
authorized political committee. 5 6 The contribution provisions prior
to Buckley, however, did not control contributions to organizations
or groups that sought to engage in independent electoral
advocacy. 5 7 After the Buckley decision Congress added such a curb
on contributions. 58 Specifically, the law fixed a $1,000 lid on
contributions to "any candidate and his authorized political
committees
committees."59 Contributions to the "political
established and maintained by a national political party" were
limited to $20,000.60 Moreover, contributions "to any other
political committee" were limited to $5,000.61 The Act defined
"political committee" as "any committee, club, association, or
other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in
excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar
year. "62 According to this catch-all category of "other political
committees," groups or associations are recognized as functioning
essentially outside the mainstream of particular electoral
campaigns. These groups may engage in "independent spending"
in support of or in opposition to a candidate. The "independent
expenditures" involved, according to; the 1976 Amendment, are for
the purchase of political advertising that either supports or
advocates the defeat of a candidate for federal office without any
cooperation or consultation with the candidate or the candidate's
authorized committees. 63 Further, such non-candidate committees
may collect funds to give to candidates, but they are then subject to
64
the applicable contribution limits.

disbursements of money and transfers of things of value for the purpose of influencing federal
elections. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(e) (West 1977). This section was again amended in 1980, but no
essential changes were made in the "contribution" definitions. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (8) (A) (West
Supp. 1980).
56. See H. R. REP. No. 10057, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 31, 57-58 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. &ADMIN.
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57. Id.
58. See2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (West 1977).
59. Id.
60, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (a) (1) (B) (West 1977).
61.2 U.S.C.A. S 441a (a) (l) (C) (West 1977).
62.2 U.S.C.A. S431 (d) (West 1977).
63. An "independent expenditure" is "an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation
with any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made
in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate or any authorized committee or
agent of such candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17)(West Supp. 1980). Moreover, "clearly identified,"
in the above context, is defined to mean that (1) the name of the candidate involved appears; (2) a
photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or (3) the identity of the candidate is apparent by
unambiguous reference. 2 U.S.C.A. S 431 (18)(West Supp. 1980).
64. In short, expenditures made in concert with a candidate are contributions. 2 U.S.C.A.
441 a(a)(7)(B)(i) (West 1977).
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The 1976 Amendment to the FECA signaled the advent of a
new era in the field of campaign finance regulation. The
Amendment has shifted some of the focus of campaign finance law
from the candidate and his authorized committees to the multitude
of unauthorized committees. While Buckley v. Valeo equated
campaign spending with 'the free market of ideas, 65 Congress
attempted to ensure, through passage of the new amendment, that
66
campaign fund-raising did not become a free market of influence.
In placing new limits on contributions to committees in 1976,
Congress was attempting to guard against the possibility that
"independent" political committees might become vehicles for
avoiding the restrictions set upon direct contributions to
candidates. The Conference Committee Report on the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 explained the reasons
for the ceilings on contributions to non-candidate committees
contained in section 441a(a)(1) as follows:
[F]irst, these limits restrict the opportunity to circumvent
the $1,000 and $5,000 limits on contributions to a
candidate; second, these limits serve to assure that
candidates' reports reveal the root sources of the
contributions the candidate has received; and third,
these limitations minimize the adverse impact on the
statutory scheme caused by political committees that
appear to be separate entities pursuing their own ends, but
are actually a means for advancing a candidate's
67
campaign.
In short, Congress accepted the Buckley result that a committee
wishing to engage in independent spending could not be subject to
restrictions on those expeditures. Yet, the 1976 Amendment limits
the amount of money that can be solicited by such a committee
68
wishing to engage in independent expenditures.
One problem not resolved by the Amendment (and in fact
exacerbated by it) was the unclear distinction between
contributions and expenditures. This problem of mixed committee
giving (with a $5,000 limit) and spending (with no limit) was at
issue in a California case in 1979.69 The California Medical
65. 424 U.S. at 15.
66. H.R. REP. No. 10057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 57-58 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. &ADMIN.

67.
68.
69.
May 22,
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Id.
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (a)(1)(c) (West 1977).
California Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. C-79-1197-WHO (N.D. Cal., filed
1979), certified questions answered, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Association (CMA) is an unincorporated membership organization
whose members consist of approximately 25,000 physicians in the
state.7 0 The California Medical Political Action Committee
(CALPAC) is a political committee sponsored by CMA and
registered with the Federal Election Commission. 71 The case arose
from an enforcement proceeding before the Federal Election
Commission in October, 1978.72 The allegation was made at the
proceeding that CMA had exceeded the contribution limits under
the law.73 The Commission interprets the law to limit contributions
by an unincorporated membership organization to its separate
segregated fund (or political action committee) to $5,000 per
year. 74 The Commission found "reason to believe" that CMA had
violated the contribution limit of the law by donating funds in
excess of $5,000 to CALPAC, a multicandidate political
committee. 75 CMA appealed to the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of California. 76 That court certified the questions
involved to the circuit court. CMA argued that, as exemplified by
Buckley v. Valeo, 77 the need to avoid the actuality or appearance of
any quid pro quo arrangements between contributions and
candidates justifies limits on contributions to candidates. 78 But,
CMA argued that the same rationale cannot be extended to
contributions to a political committee because gifts to a committee
79
do not involve the same suspicious contribution-candidate nexus.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
constitutional claims asserted by CMA.80 Following its view of
Buckley v. Valeo, the court held that the contribution limits impose
70. California Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 623.
72. Fed. Election Comm'n, Proceedings, Oct. 4, 1978.
73. Id. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (West 1977).
74. Section 441a (a)(1) declares that "[n]o person shall make contributions." 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(a)(1) (West 1977) (emphasis added). As an unincorporated membership organization, CMA falls
within the definition of the word "person." See 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(h) (West 1977). "'Person' means
an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, and any other
organization or group of persons." Id.
75. Fed. Election Comm'n, Proceedings, Oct. 4, 1978. See also 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (1)(C) (West
1977). A multicandidate political committee is a political committee that has been registered for six
months, received contributions from more than 50 persons, and contributed to five or more federal
candidates. A multicandidate committee may give $5,000 to a candidate or his authorized political
committees, $15,000 to national party committees, and $5,000 to any other political committee. 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 441a (a)(2) & 441a (a)(4) (West 1977).
76. California Medical Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. C-79-1197-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed
May 22, 1979).
77. 424 U.S. at 26-27.
78. 641 F.2d at 624. CMA contended that the limited congressional purpose of enacting the
$5,000 limitation was only to prevent funneling contributions to a particular candidate. Id.
79. Id. The court rejected CMA's assertion, stating that "[tlhis is a crabbed view of the Act and
an unrealistic appraisal of the definition and role of a multicandidate political committee." Id.
80. Id. (claims of infringement on first amendment right of speech and association, and fifth
amendment right to be free from classification which offends due process rejected).
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only inconsequential restrictions on speech interests. 8 ' The court
stated that these limits fail in the light of the "potent alternative
means of expression" available to unincorporated associations such
as CMA. 2 It observed that CMA and its members may themselves
make contributions, as long as the per-candidate and percommittee limits are respected, and that CMA, its members, and
CALPAC may make unlimited expenditures to express their own
views.83 The court reasoned that limits on donations to political
committees are essential to close what would otherwise be an
anomalous opportunity to evade the contribution limits. The law
supplies a "proper mechanism" to ensure compliance with limits
on contributions to a candidate by preventing persons from
contributing unlimited sums to political committees such as
CALPAC. 84 Moreover, CMA, an unincorporated association, is
not subject to an annual overall $25,000 donation limit as are
individuals, and CALPAC, as a multicandidate committee, may
contribute up to $5,000 to as many candidates as it chooses. 8 5
The problem spotlighted by the CALPAC case is that, without
restrictions on the amount of money which an unincorporated
association could give to a political committee, there would be no
effective ceiling on the amount the group could channel to a chosen
candidate. Because unincorporated associations are not subject to
an overall ceiling on aggregate annual contributions, they can not
only give without limit to any number of committees, but through
that advantage, they can also dominate and direct the contribution
policies of the committees.8 6 Thus, the source of influence could be
magnified, if not hidden. Furthermore, without disclosure
requirements, it would be kept from the public that a
multicandidate contribution was in fact a donation from an
unincorporated association.
81. Id. at 628. Appellants had argued that the $5,000 contribution limit violated their first
amendment speech and association rights by preventing unlimited contributions to political
committees such as CALPAC. Id. at 625.
82. Id. at 630.
83. Id. at 631.
84. Id. at 626.
85. Id. at 624-25. CMA also claimed they were invidiously discriminated against because
corporations and labor organizations related under 2 U.S.C.A. Sections 431(8) (B) (vi) and 441b (b)
(2)(c) are not subject to the $5,000 limit in paying for the establishment, administration, and
solicitation expenses of their segregated political funds. CMA contended that as an association they
were embraced by the phrase, "membership organizations," thus falling within the exemption for
unlimited administrative support under the above sections. See 2 U.S.C.A. 5§ 431 (8) (B) (vi), 441b
(b) (2) (C) (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an association such as CMA
was not intended to fall within this exemption. 641 F.2d at 629-30. The court reasoned that section
431 (e) defining "contribution" provides an exemption for administrative support, but by its terms,
the exemption is confined only to "a corporation or a labor organization." Id. at 630. See 2 U.S.C.A.
S 431 (e)(5)(F)(West 1977).
86. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 45 (1975).
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Unlike unincorporated associations, corporations and labor
unions are prohibited from making any contributions at all. The
law states that "[it is unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever,
or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any [federal] election ....

"I"

To ameliorate the

force of this ban, Congress allowed corporations and labor unions
the opportunity to establish and support "separate segregated
'
fund[s] to be utilized for political purposes. "88
The Act strictly
regulates the method by and frequency with which the corporation
or labor union may solicit contributions for the separate segregated
fund. 9 Corporate political activity evolved directly from an
administrative decision made by the Commission through its
advisory opinion authority a full year before Congress incorporated
such activity into statutory law. 90
III. PACS AND THE FREE MARKET FOR INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES
In 1975 the Sun Oil Company requested advice on the
organization of political action committees and employee-giving
87. 2 U.S.C.A. S 441b (a) (West 1977).
88. 2 U.S.C.A. S 441b (b)(2) (West 1977). This provision was included in the FECA of 1971.
Although corporations and unions have been prohibited since 1907 from making direct contributions
in federal elections, the FECA of 1971 expanded the permissible scope of corporate and union
political activity. The Act allowed corporations and unions to communicate on any subject with their
shareholders, members, and families, and also permitted these entities to conduct non-partisan
registration and get-out-the-vote drives. The significant feature of the Act, however, so far as the
corporations and unions were concerned was the opportunity to establish and support separate
segregated funds, i.e., to set up political action committees (PACs).
Separate segregated funds can be set up by corporations, labor organizations, membership
organizations, cooperatives, or corporations without capital stock. 2 U.S.C.A. S 441b (b) (2) (C)
(West 1977). These entities are allowed to solicit contributions to their separate segregated funds
subject to specific rules concerning the voluntariness of such contributions. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (b) (3)
(West 1977). The law also prohibits corporations and. labor organizations from soliciting such
contributions more than twice a year. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (b) (4) (B) (West 1977).
A PAC qualifies as a "political committee" under the FECA definition if it receives
contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount over $1,000. 2
U.S.C.A. § 431 (d) (West 1977). If the PAC meets this definition it must have a chairman and a
treasurer and must register with the FEC.
Contributions to candidates and their authorized committees can be made to PACs subject to
the contribution limitations in 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (a) (1) (West 1977). A PAC also may qualify as a
multicandidate committee. In that case the contribution limits under Section 441a (a) (2) are
operative. See 2 U.S.C.A. 5 441a (a) (2) (West 1977). Ifa PAC spends independently of a candidate,
there is no limitation. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (p) (West 1977).
A pressing topic not within the scope of this article concerns the constitutionality of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act (2 U.S.C. § 441b (West 1977)) after the Supreme Court's decision in First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court struck down the provisions of a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate financial participation in elections, except when the
business interest of a corporation is materially affected. The law was held unconstitutional because it
unduly interfered with the public's right to hear a protected message. The implications of Bellotti as
applied to PACs raises intriguing first amendment questions that have not gone unexplored. See, e.g.,
Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First National Bank of Boston v..
Bellotti, 28 Am. U.L. REV. 149 (1979); KILEY, Pacingthe Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak andthe
Public Right to HearAfter First NationalBank v. Bellotti, 22 ARiz. L. REv. 427 (1980).
89. 2 U.S.C.A. S441b(b)(West 1977).
90. FEC Advisory Opinion 1975-23 (Nov. 24, 1975).
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programs for political activities. 91 Sun Oil proposed to use
corporate funds to set up, administer, and solicit voluntary
contributions for its SUN PAC. These contributions were to be
placed in a separate, segregated fund to be used for political
purposes. 92 A trustee payroll deduction plan would also be
established to encourage employee contributions. Those funds
would be channeled to candidates, committees, and parties
specified by the contributing employee. 93 The Commission ruled
that Sun Oil could financially support SUN PAC provided SUN
PAC was maintained as a separate, segregated fund. 94 The
Commission further required that all political expenditures in
federal elections must emanate from voluntary contributions,
which could permissibly be solicited from stockholders and
employees. 95 Because employees were included in the solicitation
authorization, the employee deduction plan could also be set up
and administered from corporate funds. Care would have to be
taken, however, to ensure that contributions were neither coerced
nor earmarked for a particular candidate, committee, or party by
the corporation.
Following this advisory opinion, the total number of PACs
quickly trebled, with 1,938 such committees operative during the
1978 campaign. 96 Although most PACs make direct contributions
to candidates, in the 1980 campaign, 120 committees, groups, and
individuals made independent expenditures involving 300
candidates for federal office. 97 In the presidential election
campaign, independent expenditures on behalf of Ronald Reagan
exceeded $9.5 million compared to $36,500 total for Jimmy
Carter. 98 Independent expenditures in opposition to Jimmy Carter
totaled $234,000. 99 Only $6,000 was spent independently in
opposition to Reagan.100 Thus, while in total dollars the
91. Id. This brief summary is based on the analysis by Edwin M. Epstein. See Epstein,
Corporationsand Labor Unions in Electoral Politics, 425 ANNALS 53-55 (May 1976).
92. FEC Advisory Opinion 1975-23 (Nov. 24, 1975).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The law delineates three general classes of people who may legally be solicited to make
contributions to a corporation or union's separate segregated fund. First, stockholders and executive
or administrative personnel and their families may be solicited for contributions. 2 U.S.C.A. 5 441b
(b) (2) (A) (West 1977). Second, members of labor organizations may be solicited. Id. Third, all
other corporate employees are subject to solicitation. 2 US.C.A. 5 441b (b) (4) (B) (West 1977).
96. See, e.g., PoliticalAction Committee SpendingSoars, 16.6 SOCIETY 3 (Sept./Oct. 1979).
97. FEC Press Release (Oct. 31, 1980).
98. The expenditure figures were extracted from a Commission computer summary dated Jan.
3, 1981, augmented by hand calculation of 30-day post election reports of the five most active PACs:
Americans for Change (AFC), Americans for an Effective Presidency (AEP), Congressional Club,
Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM), and National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC). FEC Computer Summary (Jan. 3, 1981).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Republican candidate to Democratic candidate ratio was 1.33:1,
the ratio in the parallel campaign represented by independent
expenditures amounted to 264:1 ($264 dollars spent on behalf of
Reagan to every dollar spent on behalf of Carter). 101
The unparalleled increase in the amount of independent
spending conducted through PACs has not occurred without
attendant problems. While the SUN PAC advisory opinion
provided the mechanism and "green light" for the independent
expenditure surge, which occurred as a result of Buckley v. Valeo,
two Commission rulings on Matters Under Review (MUR) reveal
the difficulty of enforcing the law in the absence of any expenditure
limit enforcement tool. 102 The Commission is left with disclosure as
a sanction 0 3 and the extremely difficult task of ensuring the
independence of independent expenditures. 10 4 Because of this, the
handling of independent expenditures has caused concern with the
Commission. Its treatment of this vexing problem is revealed in
two MURs.
101. This would come as no surprise to those who appreciate the value of independent
expenditures. Herbert E. Alexander, Director of the Citizens Research Foundation and frequently
cited authority on political finance, called independent expenditures "a good safety valve for people
to vent their emotions." See Light, Surge in Independent Campaign Spending, CONG. Q., Jul. 14, 1980, at
1635. Alexander's own empirical findings, however, suggest that the act of political participation
through substantive contributions rests with the economically advantaged, and that efforts to widen
participation do not seem to have any effect. See PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS, MONEY IN POLITICS (1972).
Thus, it may be concluded that independent expenditures supply a vent chiefly for affluent voices.
Alexander's findings are echoed by David Adamany:
[Tlhe judicial invalidation of the limits on independent expenditures may substantially
vitiate the effectiveness of the contribution ceilings. . . . Wealthy individuals and
groups may simply spend large sums directly to advocate the election of favored
candidates ....
The candidate will be aware of these expenditures so the effect of big
money both on campaigns and candidates may be only slightly diminished by the
contribution limits.
Adamany, Sources ofMoney, 425 ANNALS 30 (1976).
Adamany's co-author of a political finance book, George Agree, flatly claims that the cost of
campaigns will increase by the amount of public funding. See Agree, Public FinancingAfter the Supreme
Court Decision, 425 ANNALS 135 (1976). Given that the total of all expenditures in the entire 1975-76
election cycle was only $1,000,000, it may not take long for Agree's prediction to materialize. See
Light, supra note 101, at 1635.
102. FEC Matter Under Review Nos. 203 & 203a (Nov. 11, 1977).
103. See 2 U.S.C.A. S 434 (West Supp. 1980).
104. David Adamany stated as follows: "Experience in Wisconsin, where expenditure limits
applied to candidates but not independent committees, suggests that so-called voluntary committees
gradually develop practices to fit their activities into the overall campaign strategy and organization
of the candidate." See Adamany, supra note 101, at 31. At the time the Supreme Court lifted the
expenditure lid, then-General Counsel for the Commission, John Murphy, commented, "We will
recommend to the Commission that we scrutinize every independent expenditure very carefully in
order to make sure there is no collusion with the candidate." Malbin, S.C. Ruling Causes Confusion,
NAT'LJ., Feb. 7, 1976, at 167-68. However, Neil 0. Staebler, an FEC commissioner acknowledged,
"As an experienced politician, I would say it would be very difficult . . . [to prove collusion]." Id.
Lawyers for one of the petitioners in Buckley believe, alternatively, that the Commission should pass
regulations acknowledging the right of candidates to publicize all aspects of their candidacy and
campaign strategy without affecting the independence of those who would use such information to
target the impact of their expenditures. See Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath and
Prospects: The Constitutionalityof Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REv.
1361-63 (1976).
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The Commission's first attempt to deal with questions of
collusion between ostensibly independent committees and recipient
candidates 0 5 began as a result of an April 14, 1976, letter from the
President Ford Committee (PFC) to the general counsel for
Citizens For Reagan (CFR), Ronald Reagan's official campaign
committee for the 1976 presidential election primaries. 10 6 The
Commission initiated an internal inquiry following receipt from the
President Ford Committee of copies of correspondence between
PFC and CFR. 10 7 In its original letter to CFR, the President Ford
Committee described the situation as it appeared to them. One
hundred Texas delegate-candidates pledged to Reagan decided to
conduct their primary campaign as "unauthorized delegates"
acting together as Delegates For Reagan (DFR).10 8 As an
unauthorized committee, DFR could accept contributions and
make expenditures for political communications that did not affect
the limits which the Texas Citizens For Reagan (TCFR)
Committee was held to in its authorized capacity after accepting
public funds. 109 Coordination by Delegates For Reagan of activities
with TCFR, however, would violate the independent expenditure
provisions of the law. Such expenditures would then be classified as
contributions subject to reporting requirements. 110
The President Ford Committee claimed in its letter that over
twenty of the "unauthorized" delegate-candidates pledged to
Reagan were members of the official TCFR campaign
organization. 1 ' The Ford group provided copies of Reagan
campaign materials and communications alleging that DFR used
these same campaign materials in their pursuit of delegate status. 112
The letter from PFC pointed out that a Reagan fund-raising
reception for the candidate required that ticket requests go to CFR
but that checks should be made payable to DFR.11 3 Ford partisans
also provided evidence that the regional Reaganite chairman of
105. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (17) (West Supp. 1980) (defining independent expenditure). See also
11 C.F.R. 109.1 (b) (4) (i) (1980).
106. FEC Matter Under Review No. 154 (Oct. 18, 1976) (President Ford Committee's (PFC)
allegations against Citizens For Reagan (CFR) are reprinted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
Pursuant to Section 432 (e) (4) of 2 U.S.C.A., delegate committees may have authority to use
the name of the candidate (II C.F.R. 102.14 (b) (1) (1980)), whereas other political committees
cannot use the name of the candidate without proper authorization. 2 U.S.C.A. S 432 (e) (4) (West
Supp. 1980). The key to authorization is written permission of the candidate to accept contributions
or make expenditures on behalf of that candidate. 11 C.F.R. 100.5 (f)
(2) (1980). These definitions
were not officially in effect at the time of the MUR, but were in written form as a policy statement.
109. See. I.R.C. S§ 9033, 9035.
110.2 U.S.C.A. SS 434,441a (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
111. See FEC Matter Under Review No. 154 (Oct. 18, 1976).
112. Id. at2.
113. Id.
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TCFR conducted DFR fund raising and political campaign
meetings prior to delegate selection. 114 Ford adherents noted that in
Fort Worth and San Antonio, TCFR and DFR had neighboring
offices and, in one case, had connecting office suites with shared
equipment. 1 5 Based on these facts, PFC contended that Delegates
1 16
for Reagan was clearly affiliated with Texas Citizens for Reagan.
Thus, the Reagan Citizens' group should report the activities of the
Reagan Delegates' group as its own, or violate the contribution
law.
The Commission staff agreed that there was a possible
violation of 2 U.S.C. sections 434 and 441(a) and, since PFC did
not file a formal complaint, initiated an inquiry solely on the basis
of the PFC letter. 1 7 It requested relevant information from CFR
on June 29, 1976. CFR, however, ignored this request.1 1 8 After
briefly repeating the allegations, General Counsel John G.
Murphy, Jr., recommended that "[i]n light of the fact that this
matter arose from a referral which was never followed by a
complaint and, in addition, does not involve information
ascertained in the normal course of the Commission's supervisory
responsibilities, we recommend that the file be closed. '"119 On
October 19, 1976, the Commission voted 6-0 that there is "no
reason to believe a violation of the FECA, as amended, has been
committed. "120
Whether the allegations were justified is a moot point. What is
unfortunate is that, by initiating an inquiry without a formal
complaint or information generated from internal monitoring, by
requesting information from the accused party, and by closing the
issue without requiring that party to respond, the Commission
leaves an impression of weakness and unwillingness to follow
through and enforce the law. That conjecture becomes more
plausible with an analysis of a second MUR, again involving
Citizens for Reagan.1 21 The matter involved CFR and the
Conservative Victory Fund (CVF) of the American Conservative
Union (ACU). A Commission letter to the assistant treasurer of
CVR and ACU (affiliated committees) stated that, in the course of
carrying out its routine supervisory duties, the Commission
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (5) (6) & (7) (West Supp. 1980) (statute upon which the President
Ford Committee based its contentions).
117. FEC Matter Under Review No. 154 (Oct. 18, 1954).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FEC Matter Under Review Nos. 203 & 203a (Nov. 11, 1977).
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determined that there was "reason to believe" that expenditures
made by ACU and CVF "in cooperation, consultation, or concert
122 If
with Citizens For Reagan or its agent" are not independent.
they are not independent, they have been misreported 12 3 and may
exceed the legal limit on contributions. 124 At issue were
expenditures of about $150,000 made by AQU and in-kind
contributions totaling $5,000 made by CVF, along with the fact
125
that four individuals served as officials of both ACU and CFR.
,Commission fact finding also noted that ACU and CFR used many
of the same vendors and that Citizens for Reagan had certain
26
employees of the American Conservative Union on its payroll. 1
Attorneys for ACU/CVF responded to the Commission's
letter in October, providing general answers and a strong objection
to the investigation. In March 1977 the Commission ordered
ACU/CVF to respond under oath to a second, more detailed set of
questions. 127 At the same time, a letter was sent to CFR requesting
further information regarding its possible participation in the
matter. CFR did not respond to the questions.128 Instead, it posed a
series of questions to the Commission, implying that it would not
answer the Commission's questions until the Commission
29
answered the queries posed by CFR. 1
Interaction with CFR ended there. The Commission
subsequently devised various tests to substantiate violations of
coordination constraints. Specifically, the Commission compared
ACU and CFR expenditures to determine whether ACU
concentrated expenditures in states in which CFR had reached its
legal limit. 13

0

The Commission also compared commercial vendors

to determine the nature and extent of shared sources, and further
reviewed expenditures to individuals involved with both
committees.1 3 1 Claiming that the results of these tests did not
conflict with sworn testimony of ACU/CVF, the General Counsel
122. Id.
123. Id. Such action would be in violation of section 434b of2 U.S.C.A. See 2 U.S.C.A. S 434b
(West Supp. 1980).
124. See 2 U.S.C.A. S 441 (a) (2) (West 1977).
125. FEC Matter Under Review Nos. 203 & 203a (Nov. 11, 1977). These officials served as
regional coordinators. A total of nine individuals were found to have been both in policymaking
positions and in the Conservative Victory Fund. In responding under oath to FEC's questions, the
executive director of ACU explained that those serving dual roles were not involved in decisions with
regard to CVF's independent expenditure activity. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Such action is required by 2 U.S.C.A. section 437d (a) (1). See 2 U.S.C.A. S 437d (a)
(1) (West Supp. 1980).
128. Letter from Federal Election Commission to Citizens For Reagan (March, 1977).
129. Letter from Citizens For Reagan to the Federal Election Commission (April 7, 1977).
130. FEC Matter Under Review Nos. 203 & 203a (Nov. 11, 1977).
131. Id.
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recommended the following action: That the Commission (1) seek
further information through subpoenas of ACU/CVF and CFR
documents; (2) take the position that the overlap of personnel alone
is enough to prove coordination; or (3) accept ACU/CVF
testimony as accurate and find no reasonable "cause to believe.""'
The Commission voted 5-1 to follow the third course of action. 113
Clearly, the Commission failed to act when action of some sort
might have established a far different environment for the 1980
presidential election campaign. As it was, the Commission
indicated to PACs that they could conduct their various campaigns
as they wished. 134 Government regulators would not interfere.
Fortunately, someone chose to intervene. Following its
traditionally effective strategy, Common Cause stepped in where
35
the Commission feared to tread. 1
IV. FREE MARKET FOR INFLUENCE
On July 1, 1980, Common Cause filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia 136 alleging that
Americans For Change (AFC), a PAC formed to raise and expend
funds on behalf of Ronald Reagan for President, 37 was acting in
violation of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1974.
The Fund Act of 1974138 set up a Presidential Election
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. In a scathing dissent, FEC Commissioner Neil 0. Staebler denounced the Commission's
action. He wrote the following:
In order for ACU's expenditure to be independent, ACU must be completely
independent of CFR. The record indicates that ACU personnel . . . inevitably
acquired from the candidate's agents material information about the campaign's
plans, projects and needs; that the information was acquired at a time when the two
organizations were working toward the same goals. . . The evasive statements of
ACU and CFR officials do not effectively ... explain the ties .... [Their] assertions at
least bear further inquiry....
Referring to FEC's analysis, Staebler continued:
The record of expenditures . . . raises serious questions . . . If these reasonable
possibilities are t,..e, the conduct of ACU, CVF and CFR systematically and
significantly violated the law. . . . I fear that the impression left may be that if a
committee is brazen enough and massive enough in its violations and sophisticated
enough in its operations, the law will somehow not be applied.
FEC Matter Under Review Nos. 203 & 203a (Nov. 11, 1980) (Staebler, Comm'r., dissenting).
135. See Fleishman & Greenwald, PublicInterest Litigation and PoliticalFinanceReforn, 425 ANNALS
117 (1976). See also [ 1979] FEC POLITICAL ACTION REPORT 26.
136. Common Cause v. Schmitt, No. 80-1609 (D.D.C. filed.Jul. 1,1980).
137. Id. The Americans For Change were registered as a political committee as required by
federal law. See 2 U.S.C.A. 5 431 (4) (West Supp. 1980) & I.R.C. § 9002(9).
138. I.R.C. 55 9001-9012; 9031-9042, and scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. See generally H.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM (1976).
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Campaign Fund which draws its income from a voluntary income
tax checkoff that allows citizens to allocate one to two dollars to the
fund each year.139 This money is designated only for presidential
candidates to cover primary election expenses, the costs of
nominating conventions, and expenses for the general election. 140
In the primaries, federal money is allocated on a matching basis
with private contributions once a certain minimum is collected.
Three million dollars, plus an inflation factor, are dispersed to the
major parties for their nominating conventions.14 1 In primary
elections, presidential candidates may spend without limit, or, by
accepting federal subsidies, they may agree to a spending limit of
up to $200,000 or 16 cents for each voting aged resident (whichever
figure is greater) in each state, plus the cost of living escalator. 142 In
the general election, presidential candidates who accept public
funding are thereby limited to $20,000,000 plus a percentage for
cost-of-living increases. 14 A number of provisions in the Fund Act
allow for expenditures beyond this limit; e.g., state committees are
14 4
allowed to engage in spending on behalf of national candidates.
The objective is to enable political parties to play a strong role in
furthering the election of their nominees. 14 The FECA and the
Fund Act also contain several provisions designed to encourage
grass-roots political activity 14 6 and to allow individuals and groups
7
to spend substantial sums on presidential campaigns.1
Publicly financed presidential candidates in the general
election are forbidden to accept any form of private contribution to
augment the public fund except to compensate for deficiencies in
the fund. 14 8 Individuals and political committees are also limited in
14 9
their ability to make either money or in-kind contributions.
These restrictions were presaged by Buckley v. Valeo, in which the
Court stated that "Congress may condition acceptance of public
funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified
expenditure limitations."150 The restrictions were upheld by the
139. I.R.C. S 6096.
140. I.R.C. SS 9008(c), 9037.
141.3 Fed. Reg. 15126 (1980) (amending I.R.C. S 9008).
142.2 U.S.C.A. 5441a (b)(1) (A) (West 1977).
143. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (b) & (c) (West 1977).
144. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a (d) (West 1977).
145. See 2 U.S, C.A. S 431 (8)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1980); 5 441a (d) & (s) (West 1977).
146. The value of services provided without compensation by an individual who volunteers to
assist a candidate is exempted from the definition of "contribution" by 2 U.S.C.A. section 431(8)
(B) (i). 2 U.S.C.A. § 3431 (8) (B) (i) (West Supp. 1980). Another provision exempts costs incurred
by a state and local committee of a political party for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities
in presidential elections. 2 U.S.C.A. 5 431 (8)(B)(xii) (West Supp. 1980).
147. 2 U.S.C.A. SS 431 (8) (B) (ii) & (iv), 431 (9) (B) & (17); I.R.C. §S 9002 (9) & 9012 (f).
148. I.R.C. §5 9003(b) (9), 9007(b) (3) & 9012(b) (1).
149, I.R.C. 5 9012(b).
150. 424 U.S. at 57 n. 65.
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Supreme Court in Republican National Committee v. Federal Election
Commission. 151 In that case the Court affirmed the conclusion of a
three judge federal district court which had held that the public
interest purposes behind Congress' decision to provide for the
financing of presidential elections was validly served by the
52
imposition of reasonable campaign financing limits.1
One of the key safeguards to the public financing system is the
limitation on expenditures by unauthorized political committees. 151
The statute specifically limits expenditures in excess of $1,000 by
political committees, other than those authorized by the candidate,
when such expenditures are made to further a publicly funded
candidate's election and would, if viewed by the candidate's
54
authorized committees, constitute qualified campaign expenses.1
Common Cause claimed in its suit that AFC is closely linked,
through its officers and agents, to the Republican Party, the
Republican National Committee (RNC), and the Ronald Reagan
campaign organization, thus falling within the definition of section
9012(f). 155 Common Cause asserted, therefore, that AFC should be
found in violation of section 9012(f). 156 Further, Common Cause
anticipated that, for the remainder of the campaign, the AFC
organization would be coordinated with the official Reagan
campaign;1 57 thus, contributions to AFC would be contributions to
the candidate in violation of Fund Act provisions, 158 and AFC
59
expenditures would in fact be those of the Reagan campaign. 1
151. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'dmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
152. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). Plaintiff contested the constitutionality of the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act by raising six issues at the federal district court level. 487 F. Supp. at 282.
Plaintiff argued that the first amendment was violated by conditioning eligibility for public funds
upon compliance with expenditure limitations, and because the provision forces a candidate, out of
practical necessity, to accept public funds. Id. at 283. Plaintiffalso argued that the Act discriminated
in favor of incumbents and in favor of those affiliated with labor organizations in violation of the first
and fifth amendments. Id. at 285. A first and fifth amendment violation was also alleged on the
ground that the statute was overbroad. Id. at 287. Finally, plaintiff argued that Congress' passage of
the Act violated the ninth amendment. Id. at 289. The federal district court concluded that there was
no showing of unconstitutionality as to any ofplaintiff's allegations. Id. at 289-90.

153. I.R.C. § 9012(f).

154. Id.
155. Common Cause v. Schmitt, No. 80-1609 (D.D.C., filedJul. 1, 1980).
156. Id. See Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D.D.C. 1980).
157. See 512 F. Supp. at 501.
158. See id. at 503. See also I.R.C. S 9003(b) (2) (major party eligibility for public monies);
I.R.C. 5 9012 (b) (1) (acceptance of contributions in excess of those permitted).
159. See 512 F. Supp. at 503. Such contributions would violate those sections of the Fund Act
dealing with qualified campaign expenses and excess expenses in a presidential campaign. SeeI.R.C.
§ 9002 (11); I.R.C. § 9012(a) (1) & (b) (1). In announcing the suit to the media before its filing,
Common Cause Counsel Archibald Cox explained the allegations and Common Cause's rationale in
pursuing the matter. Common Cause Press Release, Jul. 1, 1980. The plan for public financing of
presidential elections (which was designed to eliminate the impacts of large contributions,
particularly the reality of appearances of corruption of public officials), Cox said, "would be
seriously distorted and undermined by the proposed independent expenditures." Id. He noted that
the provisions of the Fund Act, which are separate and distinct from the FECA, were not addressed
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The Commission immediately responded to Common Cause's
action by filing a motion for leave to intervene followed by the filing
of its own suit against AFC, Americans For an Effective Presidency
(AEP), and Fund For a Conservative Majority (FCM). 160 In the
intervenor motion, the Commission claimed that Common Cause
was impinging upon the Commission's jurisdiction as enforcer of
the FECA and the Fund Act, 161 and that it would file its own suit
seeking declaratory judgment and relief with respect to the
construction and validity of I.R.C. section 9012(f). 1 62 In its suit
the Commission alleged that all three PACs were in violation of
section 9012(f). The Commission urged the court to find that
section constitutional and the three committees to be in violation of
the $1,000 expenditure limitation. 163 Throughout the summer,
legal exchanges among the parties ensued, including a request by
Common Cause that the two cases be joined.1 6 4 Two parties 16 5 filed
amicus curiae briefs asking the court to declare section 9012(f)
unconstitutional on its face, citing as authority the Court's holding
in Buckley v. Valeo declaring
expenditure
limitations
unconstitutional. 1 66 Both Common Cause and the Commission
drew the line between Buckley and their cases at the point of public
funding. 67 Defendants in both cases argued that section 9012(f)
in Buckley v. Valeo, and represent a permissible exercise of congressional authority. He likened the
AFC effort to quasi-professional fund raising and campaign spending. Id.
Cox also challenged the independence of the proposed expenditures, naming 12 individuals
who currently are, or recently were, policymakers in the Republican Party, the Republican National
Committee, or the Reagan campaign. He stated that these links are too strong to fit the kind of
independence intended in Buckley. Further, Mr. Cox questioned how these individuals could
realistically isolate themselves from their party ties to be temporary independent operators. Id.
160. Federal Election Comm'n v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 (D.D.C., filed Jul. 15,
1980).
161. Federal Election Comm'n Motion for Leave to Intervene, Common Cause v. Schmitt, No.
80-1609 (D.D.C., filed Jul. 1, 1980). The allegation was made pursuant to 2 U.S.C.A. section 4 3 7c
(b) (1), which states as follows: "The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with
and formulate policy with respect to, this Act [FECA of 1971] and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title
26 [Fund Act]. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil
enforcement of such provisions." 2 U.S.C.A. S 437c (b) (1) (West Supp. 1980).
162. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 at 4 (D.D.C., filed
Jul. 15, 1980).
163. Id. at 3,8-11.
164. The motion for consolidation pertained to Common Cause v. Schmitt, No, 80-1609
(D.D.C., filedJul. 1, 1980) and Federal Election Comm'n v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754
(D.D.C., filedJul. 15, 1980).
165. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Southwest Legal Foundation.
166. Federal Election Comm'n v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 (D.D.C., filed Jul. 15,
1980). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 143.
167. Both parties relied on Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.
Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y,), aff'd men., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). Common Cause argued that there is a
difference between individual independent expenditures and group independent expenditures.
Common Cause v. Schmitt, No. 80-1609 (D.D.C., filed Jul. 1, 1980). The latter involves an act
which separates the person from the speech and thus results in conduct related to speech. See Wright,
Politics and the constitution: Is Money Speech.?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). Therefore, by donating to a
PAC, an individual is not speaking and not retaining full control over the decisions. An example
would be a committee that makes expenditures on behalf of several candidates by using funds
contributed by voters who may favor only one or two of those candidates.
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was unconstitutional under the first amendment. 168
Oral arguments were heard on August 19, 1980. On August
28, 1980, the three judge district court issued an expedited order:
(1) denying Common Cause's motion to consolidate; (2) dismissing
Common Cause's count alleging that AFC was not independent on
the basis of its findings in the Commission's complaint; (3)
dismissing Common Cause's claim of violations of contribution
limits on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction; (4) denying the
Commission's motion for summary judgment and; (5) granting,
inter alia, the defendants' motion for summary judgment declaring
169
section 9012(f) unconstitutional.
On September 25, 1980, the three judge court consolidated
the two cases and on September 30, 1980, issued an opinion
authored by Judge Wilkey. The court found that, by its language,
section 9012(f) prohibits all expenditures over $1,000, including

independent expenditures. 170 Judge Wilkey then declared,
however, that section 9012(f) is unconstitutional because, like the
similar provision at issue in Buckley, it is an "impermissible
limitation of the freedoms of speech and associationprotected by the
First Amendment. ",171 Significantly, the decision avoids a direct
confrontation with the issue of coordination with the candidate.
Was the court indicating that the issue of coordination is trivial?
The reasoning is not clear, as the opinion then turns toward the
expenditure/contribution dilemma, thereafter applying the
association reference to the right of individuals toform associations
or join associations (e.g., a political party) as a method of
speaking.1 7 The issue of coordination between independent
associations and the candidate was not addressed again in the
168. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 (D.D.C., filed Jul.
15, 1980).
169. Common Cause v. Schmitt, No. 80-1609 (D.D.C.) (threejudge court).
170. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 492 (D.D.C. 1980). The court rejected
defendants' contention that section 9012(f) prohibits only coordinated expenditures which have been
authorized by a publicly funded presidential candidate. Id.
171. Id. at 493, 496 (emphasis added). To support its analysis, the court emphasized the
following arguments alluded to in Buckley. Campaign activity, in the form of money spent, is speech
that is afforded broad first amendment protection. Such speech is costly in today's society because of
the expense of public communication. Television, radio, and other media involved in public
communication are necessary, however, for effective political expression. Thus, a restriction on the
amount that can be spent on public communication severely restricts first amendment rights.
Moreover, the court stressed that political expression in a campaign is associational activity also
protected by the first amendment. Id. at 493.
The court also reiterated and affirmed the important distinction made in Buckley between
contributions and expenditures. Id. at 494-96. The court stated that the government interest in
avoiding the appearance of corruption justified the limit on contributions but could not justify the
expenditure limit. Id. at 495. The district court also pointed to the Republican Nat'l Comm. v.Federal
Election Comm 'n opinion regarding the distinction between those expenditures under the control of the
candidate and those not under control of the candidate, concluding that the candidate's decision to
accept public money cannot bind supporters outside the official campaign. Id. at 495 (citing 487 F.
Supp. at 286).
172. Id. at 500.
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opinion. 17 3 Instead, the court raised what it referred to as two
fundamental questions to examine whether section 9012(f) is
consistent with the first amendment after Buckley: (1) does the
defendants' proposed spending constitute an expenditure question
under Buckley?; and (2) are PACs permitted to make independent
expenditures just as individuals and formal groups are? 17 4 The
7
court answered both questions in the affirmative. 1 5
In labeling the defendants' actions "expenditures," instead of
"contributions,"
the court called committee formation a
"pooling" tool for many small voices wishing to speak politically
rather than "the transformation of contributions into political
debate [involving] speech by someone other than the
contributor. "1'76 To support its finding that PACs are permitted to
spend independently, the court explained that "speech
promulgated through a political committee bears a different
relation to its constituent contributors than does a candidate's
speech to his or her constituent supporter.''177 Committees are
bound to reflect the sentiments of their supporters, but candidates
listen and make their own judgments as to what ideas to advance.
The court concluded that, "[w]hereas a presidential candidate by
accepting public funds may choose for him or herself to go without
unlimited contributions and expenditures, the candidate's public
supporters have a separate, protected right to express themselves,
individually or jointly. This preserves access and full participation
in the public debate. "178
On October 6, 1980, Common Cause filed a notice of appeal
to the United States Supreme Court and, on October 8, 1980, the
Commission followed suit. Common Cause later removed itself
79
and joined the Commission appeal. 1
173. Such coordination clearly is a first amendment freedom of association issue that should
be subject to careful analysis and definitive determination by the courts. One can easily understand
why the FEC might be reluctant to supply a ready-made challenge for some potential complainant
through an enforcement proceeding, at least until it has devised a justifiable test of independence.
The court addressed the idea ofassociation in the following manner: "The contributors do have
power over the speech disseminated by political committees. . . . Contributors associate in a
particular political committee because that committee will express their own thoughts. . . . If a
committee disappoints its membership, contributions will dry up. . . . Thus the expenditures
undertaken by the political committees represent an efficient exercise of First Amendment rights of
associated individuals. " Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The court also stated that the associational tie
among members of political committees "is the desire to affirm publicly their political viewpoint held
in common. The organizers of political committees really only mobilize existing political sentiment
looking for an outlet.
Id. at 500.
174. Id.at 496.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 21).
177. Id. at 497.
178. Id. at 501.
179. Commn Cause v. Schmitt,: No. 80-847 (U.S. Sup. Ct., filedNov. 25, 1980), prob. juris.
noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981).
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just as the Court in Buckley equated money with speech and
reasoned that restrictions upon the use of money seriously
interfered with the free market of ideas, the FEC v. AFC opinion
raises the question of whether money can be equated with influence
or the appearance of influence. If money can be so equated, then its
use in publicly funded presidential elections creates a free market of
influence.
The object of public funding has been to "reduce the disparity
between large and small contributors and balance the influence of
special interests. ' 180 In 1960 each major party candidate spent
about $10 million. In presidential elections between 1960 and 1972,
the amount more than doubled from each previous election. In
1972 (the last election before campaign reform legislation was fully
enacted) Republicans spent $60.2 million and Democrats $38.7
million. 181 Final tabulations for 1980 show that $42.9 million was
spent on behalf of the Republican candidate and $29.6 million on
behalf of the Democratic candidate. 18 2 Relatively speaking, the
Fund Act has narrowed the spending gap between traditional
Republican "haves" and Democratic "have nots." Since the Fund
Act theoretically provides public monies and expenditure
limitations so that major party candidates1 8 3 have equal but
anonymous resources with which to present their qualifications to
the public,1 84 one is compelled to ask the purpose of $11 million in
independent expenditures. Is it to speak with virtually the same,
though perhaps a more strident, voice as the candidate, or is the
purpose to place the advertiser in a position to exert influence?
John Bailey, a principal in AEP's media/advertising consultant agency, raised the issue of a quid pro quo from the fundraising decision-makers of unauthorized political committees rather
than contributors to the committee. "The people who wield the
authority out of private fundraisers are . . . the people who raise
the money.... [T]he guy who can raise $50,000 in contributions is
the guy who is incredibly important . . . and therefore has
significant power." 1 8 5 Statements by the chairman of the National
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC, one of the
"big five" whose unauthorized expenditures for President Reagan
180. [19791 FEC POLITICAL ACTION REPORT 37.
181 .Adamany-, Sources of Money, 425 ANNALS 31 (1976).
182. Figures for 1980 Presidential Election Independent Expenditures (April 3, 1981) (available
from Public Records Office, Fed. Election Comm'n, 1325 K. St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20463).
183. 2 U.S.C.A. 437d (West Supp. 1980).
184. Agree, PublicFinancingAfter the Supreme Court Decision, 425 ANNALS 135 (1976).
185. Brief for Appellant at 10, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 50 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1981) (No. 80-847, -1067) (oral arguments heard Oct. 7, 1981).
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topped $1.5 million) are even more pointed: "Ronald Reagan is
going to be president for 4 years, and it would be awfully nice to
have as many conservative political leaders in as many positions of
responsibility as possible." 186 Reporters also noted that NCPAC's
chairman "was claiming scalps and warning that even President187
elect Reagan had better mind his conservative P's and Q's."
Reagan has a "political obligation" to follow a conservative stance
or "if he [doesn't] . . . he [will] pay the political price" for his
188
failure.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, the conduct of presidential elections has
come full-circle. We began with the traditional thought that the free
use of money in elections invites corruption. We proceeded through
legislative attempts to excise from presidential politics the debtinducing connection between giver and receiver. We now hear
voices of skepticism about the latter and renewed concern about the
marketing of influence despite the public funding of presidential
elections. This circle has been closed by well-intentioned decisions
leading to unintended outcomes.
Congress' attempt to overcome corruption and the appearance
of corruption by passage of the 1971 legislation was at least noble in
theory. The symmetry of putting lids on both expenditures and
contributions was viewed as a way to balance the various uses of
money in elections so that the potential for buying influence would
be minimized. Congress' more significant efforts at campaign
reform in 1974 in placing limits on the amount of money an
individual could spend "independently" to advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate for federal office were well-intentioned, but
encountered a constitutional obstacle in Buckley v. Valeo. In lifting
the lid on expenditures, the Court drew a distinction between
contributing and spending, calling the latter an act of speech
protected by the first amendment. 189 Its analysis was based on the
assumption that contributions have potential for corrupting elected
officials but expenditures made independently do not. ChiefJustice
Burger queried wryly:" [When] key operative provisions of this Act
are stricken, can what remains function in anything like the way
186. Id.
187. Id. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. at 284, aff'd
mem., 445 U.S. 955. (1980).
188. Id.
189. 424 U.S. at 18, 29.
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Congress intended?"' 190 Subsequent to Buckley, the number of
political action committees (PACs) grew exponentially, formed
primarily by corporations and groups of individuals for the purpose
of targeting their expenditures independently in federal
elections. 191
The potential for corruption and undue influence inherent in
these "independent" or "unauthorized" expenditures were not
compelling issues in the 1976 election. By 1980, however, the
spectre of the unfair use of money arose. 192 This fear was enhanced
at least in part by the Commission's failure-in terms of both factfinding and development of operative guidelines-to apply,
enforce, and formulate indicators applicable to the definition of
independent expenditures. Even more significant was the
Commission's failure to ascertain whether such expenditures are
coordinated and, hence, independent in appearance only.
Unfortunately, even groups that have pressed the coordination
issue, using the pointedly prohibitive language of the Fund Act,
have found the courts more than willing to skirt the problem. The
result has been to exacerbate the enforcement difficulties
encountered by the Commission and to weaken the purpose of the
Fund Act.
The emergence of these large-scale independent expenditures
by PACs, and the holding by a federal district court that the
spending limits in relation to the Fund Act are unconstitutional,
propelled the Fund Act and its faltering administration to the edge
of a precipice. Congress enacted the Fund Act to finance
presidential campaigns in such a way as to avoid implicit
obligations to private benefactors. If federal funding is set up
to encourage presidential candidates to forswear private fundraising, the intent of Congress will be subverted if a candidate is
beholden, or appears to be beholden, to influential political
operators who control and spend large sums of money, aggregated
from private contributions, in support of the publicly financed
candidate. Expenditures by independent political committees pose
as much potential for creating implicit obligations as do
coordinated expenditures. This is especially obvious in the cases of
independent political committees operated by party professionals
who raise and control multimillion dollar war chests. When such
political professionals are able to pump significant sums of money
into a parallel, but unofficial, campaign despite the candidate's
190. Id. at 254.
191. See supra notes 65 to 89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 97 to 104 and accompanying text.
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agreement to give up private funding as a condition of receiving
tax-based financing, then public financing simply cannot work. If
the "free market of ideas" implicit in the first amendment is thus
inadvertently converted into a free-for-all of influence, then serious
consideration should be given to eliminating public funding.
Other questions, not dealt with above, now seem appropriate
to raise for further scholarly inquiry. First, should independent
expenditures now be examined for their corrupting influence upon
elections through their effective intimidation by reason of the
irresponsibility with which they can be launched? (Most
organizational names provide a kind of anonymity and lack of
financial responsibility in case of libel.) Second, should we rest
upon the concept of "agent" as evidence of coordination? (We do
so now because "agent" implies deliberate intent; however, much
coordination can be very casual.) Why not search for a concept of
"conduit"
or "channel"
to assist in guiding responsible
administration of the Fund Act?
The Fund Act can survive as a method of elevating ideas above
influence only if the weakest link in the chain of regulation is
strengthened. That weak link is the coordination issue, pursuit of
which is the unmet responsibility of the Federal Election
Commission. Granted, the Commission has been constrained by
the fact that illicit coordination is difficult and time-consuming to
prove. This is particularly true when, as is usually the case, PACs
have masked their coordinations. The same masking process is
involved, however, which will secrete implicit obligations between
candidates and big spenders.
Thus, the stakes are high. The Commission must accordingly
abandon passivity in favor of developing promptly triggered
auditing procedures and fair criteria with which to judge how
money is solicited, aggregated, controlled, spent, and transformed
into legitimate political debate or, in the alternative, converted into
illicit political influence. Ongoing scrutiny of currently available
disclosure documents should focus on signs of coordination-shared vendors, pollsters, advertising agencies, and
political consultants. It is within the Commission's existing
administrative authority to more deeply probe for telltale signs of
conflicts of interest. Disclosure statements can confirm whether
PAC officers who control the format and content of political
advertising have candidate links. The Commission and the media,
in their roles as campaign watchdogs, could thereby enforce the law
and inform the public. If this task is beyond administrative
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capabilities, then it is well to know as much. Nothing less is at stake
than Congress' legitimate objective in passing the Fund Act eliminating the dangers inherent in private fund raising. That
objective was well stated by Senator Pastore, the Fund Act's
sponsor, when he declared as follows: "Let's be done with it. Let
the President be a free and independent man. Let him not be
193
beholden to anyone."

193. 119 CONG. REc. 38400 (1973).

